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Abstract. This note examines Prabhat Patnaik's argument that
the contemporary international nancial system crucially requires
the stability of oil prices in terms of the dollar. By comparing the
macroeconomic impact of recent oil shocks to those of the 1970s,
it argues that sharp changes in the dollar price of oil need not
necessarily lead to instability.
One of the most striking conclusions reached in Prof. Prabhat Pat-
naik's recent book The Value of Money is that the world monetary
system is still de facto a commodity money world, despite having bro-
ken all de jure links to the world of commodities after the collapse of
the Bretton Woods system (Patnaik, 2008, Chapter 19).
Prof. Patnaik's argument proceeds in two steps. The necessity of
the value of money being stable in terms of commodities|established
earlier in the book for a single capitalist economy|takes the form of the
necessity of the `leading currency' maintaining a stable value in terms
of commodities when the analysis moves to the setting of a world with
many capitalist economies.
A threat to this stability can come from two main sources| au-
tonomous increases in the price of labour power and increases in the
price of primary commodities. Prof. Patnaik considers the former to
be unlikely in the present de
ationary regime imposed by nance capi-
tal. As for the latter, non-oil primary commodities do not pose a major
threat to stability, most importantly because of their low share in the
gross GDP of the advanced capitalist countries.
Thus, by elimination, the essential condition for the sustenance of the
present world monetary regime with the dollar as the leading currency
is the maintenance of a stable dollar price of oil|what Prof. Patnaik
terms the oil-dollar standard|and it is in this sense that this regime
is a de facto commodity money system.
This conclusion not only has far-reaching implications for the aca-
demic understanding of the international monetary system, it also pro-
vides a basis for an understanding of the recent tendencies of US im-
perialism.
I am extremely grateful to Prof. Jayati Ghosh, Rohit, Prasenjit Bose and the par-
ticipants at the 2008 IDEAS conference on `The Value of Money and Contemporary
Capitalism' for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this note.
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The converse of Prof. Patnaik's argument is that periods in which
the dollar price of oil rises would, ceteris paribus, be periods of in-
stability of the world capitalist system. This suggests the possibility
of empirically testing, as it were, Prof. Patnaik's analysis of the con-
temporary international monetary system by looking precisely at such
periods when the dollar price of oil has been rising.
It is our purpose in the present note to set the grounds for such a
test by reviewing the existing evidence on the response of advanced
capitalist economies to oil price shocks.
We are aware that any attempt at empirical verication on these
lines is subject to a number of diculties. First, there is no way to
directly control for the violation of the ceteris paribus clause. Given
that we only have a handful of episodes of large oil price increases
over a number of decades during which the economies under study
have changed drastically, there is no way to mechanically lter out the
eects of our failure to control for `other factors'. The best way forward
seems to be to try to identify the most signicant such factors for each
episode and at least informally gauge the eect that they may have
had.
The second diculty in our exercise, common to all empirical macroe-
conomics, is our inability to observe expectations. As Prof. Patnaik
points out, temporary 
uctuations in oil prices do not pose any threat
to the oil-dollar standard. Only secular increases, or more importantly,
increases perceived to be secular increases do. However, we feel that
by not looking at all changes in oil prices but limiting ourselves to oil
price `shocks', i.e. signicant and sustained increases in oil prices, we
address this diculty to some extent.
1. The Evidence
Following the stag
ation of the 1970s, it had till recently been the
general opinion among macroeconomists that oil price shocks pose a
serious threat to the stability of the world economy, including the ad-
vanced capitalist countries. As Hamilton pointed out in his pioneering
study of the impact of oil price shocks on the US economy, Hamilton
(1983): \All but one of the U.S. recessions since World War II have
been preceded, typically with a lag of around three-fourths of a year,
by a dramatic increase in the price of crude petroleum".
The twenty-rst century has not been kind to this consensus. The
increase in petroleum prices that have followed the US invasion of
Iraq have cumulatively been as large as those of the 1970s. Yet, the
advanced capitalist countries have not faced either recession or in
a-
tion comparable to those of the stag
ation era, even though the lat-
est episode of price increase extended much beyond Hamilton's lag of
\three-fourths of a year". The fact that these economies are now in a
recession precipitated by an international nancial crisis does not oerOIL SHOCKS 3
Figure 1. US Oil Prices|West Texas Intermediate
[Source: FRED (Federal Reserve Economic Data)]
a resolution either. Even if a mechanism could be found whereby high
oil prices would be a cause of the US housing bubble bursting, the long
lag between the price increase and the slowdown would still cast doubts
on any simple mechanisms connecting oil price increases to economic
instability.
Such doubts had already started being voiced during the 1990s based
on research which showed an apparent break in the relationship be-
tween oil prices and macroeconomic variables in the 1980s, with the
relationship being much weaker in the later period. These observa-
tions led to three broad questions. Was there really a weakening in the
oil-macroeconomy relationship during the 1980s or was the apparent
weakening a statistical artifact? If the relationship was weak during
the 1980s, had it been strong even in the 1970s? If the relationship
was strong during the 1970s and weak in the 80s and 90s, what had
changed in between?
1.1. Oil shocks. Figure 1 plots the nominal US oil prices from 1970:1
to 2008:8.
Dierent methods have been suggested to identify and time `oil
shock' events from price series. Any such criteria will to some ex-
tent be arbitrary. For the sake of illustration we follow Blanchard and
Gal  (2008) who dene a `large oil shock' as \an episode involving a cu-
mulative change in the (log) price of oil above 50 percent, sustained for4 JYOTIRMOY BHATTACHARYA
run up period 50% rise date max log change ($) max log change (real)
O1 1973:3{1974:1 1974:1 104% 96%
O2 1979:1{1980:2 1979:3 98% 85%
O3 1999:1{2000:4 1999:3 91% 87%
O4 2002:1{2007:3 2003:1 125% 110%
Table 1. Postwar Oil Shock Episodes. [Source: Blan-
chard and Gal  (2008)]
O1 O2 O3 O4 AVG(1,2) AVG(3,4)
Canada 4.7 1.8 2.2 0.5 3.3 1.4
Germany 0.1 2.6 1.1 -0.2 1.4 0.4
France 5.4 3.1 1.3 0.5 4.2 0.9
U.K. 10.2 4.3 0.0 0.5 7.3 0.3
Italy 7.7 5.6 1.0 -0.1 6.6 0.4
Japan 7.9 1.0 -1.7 0.9 4.4 -0.4
U.S. 4.9 4.0 1.7 -0.2 4.5 0.7
G7 4.8 1.9 0.3 0.0 3.3 0.2
Euro12 4.3 2.7 1.3 -0.5 3.5 0.4
OECD 4.9 1.8 0.1 -0.5 3.4 -0.2
Table 2. Oil Shock Episodes: Change in In
ation.
[Source: Blanchard and Gal  (2008)]
O1 O2 O3 O4 AVG(1,2) AVG(3,4)
Canada -8.3 -1.0 -1.5 3.2 -4.6 0.8
Germany -9.6 -3.5 1.3 -2.5 -6.6 -0.6
France -7.6 -4.4 0.6 1.2 -6.0 0.9
U.K. -16.4 -9.2 0.4 2.5 -12.8 1.4
Italy -8.6 0.4 3.0 -2.0 -4.1 0.5
Japan -16.1 -4.4 7.6 3.3 -10.3 5.4
U.S. -13.3 -11.8 -3.7 7.1 -12.5 1.7
G7 -12.6 -7.7 -0.2 3.9 -10.2 1.8
Euro12 -9.1 -2.9 1.0 -0.4 -6.0 0.3
OECD -11.2 -6.5 0.1 4.1 -8.9 2.1
Table 3. Oil Shock Episodes: Cumulative Change in
GDP.[Source: Blanchard and Gal  (2008)]
more than four quarters". Using this criteria they identify the episodes
shown in Table 1.
12
1Blanchard and Gal  conclude their analysis at 2007:3. But it is evident from
gure 1 that O4 is still continuing.
2Blanchard and Gal 's criteria does not identify the shock triggered by the rst
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For the four episodes that they identify, Blanchard and Gal  calculate
the change in in
ation and GDP for the individual G7 countries as
well as a few aggregates of advanced countries. These are shown in
Tables 2 and 3. With a few exceptions both these tables show the
pattern referred to above. In the 1970s, oil price shocks clearly lead
to stag
ation. In the 1990s and 2000s, the eect is much less, if not
non-existent.
Starting with Hamilton (1983), attempts have been made to look
at the same relationship using the entire time series of oil prices and
macroeconomic aggregates rather than individual shock episodes. Mork
(1989), Hooker (1996), Hamilton (1996) are important contributions to
this literature. Once we move away from looking only at oil price in-
creases clearly associated with political/military events in the Middle
East, two problems need solving. First, to what extent can we con-
sider oil price changes as being exogenous to macroeconomic 
uctua-
tions. Second, we have to account for the possibility that the eect of
oil price increases and oil price decreases may not be symmetric. The
answer to these questions have an important bearing when evaluating
alternative theoretical explanations of the oil-price economy relation-
ship, but none of the adjustments needed to account for them overturn
the basic conclusions in the tables above|oil-price increases had a large
impact on output and in
ation in the 1970s, the eect is much less in
the 1990s and 2000s. The challenge for theory is to account for both
these facts simultaneously.
2. Recessions
2.1. Large impact on output. Any attempt to develop a theoretical
understanding of the eect of oil price shocks on output and prices
immediately comes up against the obstacle that simple models of the
macroeconomy predict changes in output that are too small. While
we would expect an increase in the price of oil to reduce the demand
for oil and for directly or indirectly energy-intensive commodities like
automobiles, it is not immediately clear why an oil price shock should
create a downturn as sharp as those of the 1970s. This is a problem
for both demand-side and supply-side theories.
The simplest supply-side mode is competitive market-clearing neo-
classical model. In a model of that sort, output is most easily modelled
as being produced jointly by labour, capital and energy by a production
function:
Y = F(N;K;E) (1)
If the price of energy is exogenously given, and a rise in energy
prices causes other factors to be substituted for energy, this may cause
output to fall. But a simple consequence of prot maximisation with
production function (1) is that the elasticity of output with respect to
a change in energy use equals the share of energy costs in total output.6 JYOTIRMOY BHATTACHARYA
For the U.S. economy a reasonable value for this share would be 4%,
which would imply an output reduction of 0.4% for every 10% decrease
in energy use, much smaller than what was observed during the 1970s.
A naive demand-side argument which sees an oil price increase as a
tax which reduces the disposable income of oil buyers and increases the
income of oil sellers would fare no better. Even if we assume that oil
sellers do not consume any domestic goods out of their extra income,
the relative income fall of oil buyers would at most be proportional to
the share of oil in consumption expenditures, and that number would
once again be too small to explain the recessions of the 1970s.
Given this, attempts have been made to explain the recessionary ef-
fects by bringing in secondary factors which may magnify the initial
impact of oil price increases. Rothemberg and Woodford (1996) bring
in imperfect competition and mark-up pricing, Finn (2000) introduces
complementarity between energy and capital and variable capital util-
isation and Hamilton (1988) introduces frictional employment arising
out of the need to move labour out of industries which are directly
or indirectly energy intensive (such as automobiles) to other indus-
tries. Apart from limited empirical support, a major problem for all
these models is their inability to explain the weakening of the oil-price
macroeconomic relationship in the last two decades.
2.2. Monetary policy and the bargaining power of workers.
Given these diculties in explaining the stag
ation of the 1970s on the
basis of purely private sector responses, one strand of literature starting
with Bernanke et al. (1997) attributes the recession to incorrect mone-
tary policy on the part of the Fed. Working in a vector auto-regression
framework, Bernanke et al. (1997) tried to simulate the eects of a
monetary policy that did not respond to oil price shocks and found
that the reduction of output was lesser in their hypothetical regime.
While the exact results of their analysis have been questioned on sta-
tistical grounds by Hamilton and Herrera (2004), it seems reasonable
to assume that at least a part of the downturn of the 1970s must be at-
tributed to recessionary monetary policies of that period. This would
t into a picture of an attempt to defend the oil-dollar standard by
squeezing the real claims of the working class. But then, the question
that follows is why such recessionary policies were not needed during
later oil shocks?
A simple mechanism of explaining this discrepancy would be by in-
voking dierences in expectation formation. The oil shocks of the 1970s
were an unprecedented event and neither citizens nor policy-makers
had any experience of dealing with such shocks and they had no way
of predicting of what the shocks would imply for the trajectory of the
economy. This brought greater uncertainty and a greater likelihood
of the shocks being considered permanent and hence triggering o aOIL SHOCKS 7
wage-price spiral. The later oil shocks were dierent both due to prior
experience as well as due to the fact that in these later episodes there
was a gradual increases in oil prices rather than a more abrupt jump.
The last shock was also widely believed to have been caused by spec-
ulation. All of these might have led to a perception of the shocks as
being transitory and hence might not have triggered o a wage-price
spiral.
While there may be an element of truth in this argument based on ex-
pectations, it cannot negate the fact that the cumulative changes in oil
prices were roughly comparable in the earlier and later episode. There-
fore we would have expected a wage-price spiral to have been triggered
o ultimately. The fact that it was not must therefore be attributed, in
a con
icting-claims framework, to the 
exibility of the claims of some
strata. Two possible explanations stand out. One, a squeeze in the
claims of domestic workers made easier by de-unionization and a re-
duction in the rights of workers in general. Two, a squeeze in the claim
of foreign workers mediated through cheaper imports. The fact that
one or both of these leads to a muting of the destabilizing eect of oil
shocks is certainly not a cause for celebration, since this muting comes
at the cost of growing inequality. However, such muting does increase
the resilience of the world monetary system based on the dollar. And
we expect that this muting would become easier as a declining energy
intensity of output makes the required squeeze in real wages smaller
over time.
3. Conclusion
The response of contemporary capitalist economies to oil price shocks
has changed. Why, can only guess, and maybe the next oil shock will
prove all predictions of fundamental change wrong. But what we do
see is that at least in certain conjunctures large oil price increase do
not automatically lead to a crisis for the system.
Does this demand a change in the analysis of the world monetary
system presented in Prof. Patnaik's book? In essence, not at all. The
fundamental impossibility of explaining the value of money through
supply-and-demand and even the need for the leading currency of the
time to maintain a stable value vis-a-vis commodities are conclusions
that stand independently of the importance or otherwise of oil.
However, the idea of an `oil-dollar standard' may indeed require re-
examination. The evidence of recent years points to the possibility of
oil joining other non-oil primary commodities in being quantitatively
insignicant in determining the trajectory of the advanced capitalist
countries.8 JYOTIRMOY BHATTACHARYA
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